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Since the 1960s, trade opportunities based on complementary 
economies have driven the Australia-Korea economic relationship.  
Australia exported raw materials, principally minerals and energy, 
which Korea processed and subsequently sold on domestic and 
international markets.  In return, Australia purchased increasing 
volumes of Korean manufactures, initially textiles, clothing and 
footwear and later automobiles.  With the onset of the financial and 
economic crisis in Korea during 1997-98, trade and investment 
opportunities were severely constrained. However, in the wake of the 
crisis, and the rapid recovery of the Korean economy underpinned by 
corporate and financial sector reforms, trade and investment 
opportunities in traditional areas have re-emerged as well as in new 
areas.  Australia’s rapid economic growth has also increased demand 
for the sorts of consumer products produced by Korea.  It is, therefore, 
opportune to consider the benefits, and obstacles, to the establishment 
of an Australia-Korea Free Trade Agreement. 
The paper analyses trends in Australia’s trade and investment with 
Korea. New areas for trade are also highlighted as well as prospects for 
an FTA between the two countries.  In doing so it: reviews the 
Australia-Korea bilateral trade relationship; reviews the nature and 
extent of foreign direct investment between Australia and Korea; 
reviews trade and investment prospects and opportunities between the 
two countries; analyses the prospects for a Korea-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (KAFTA); reviews the potential economic effects from a 
KAFTA; and identifies key policy implications.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1960s trade opportunities based on complementary economies, 
arising primarily from differences in resource endowments, has provided the 
basis for the pattern and growth of Australia-Korea bilateral trade.  Australia 
exported agricultural products and raw materials, principally minerals and 
energy, which Korea processed and sold on domestic and international 
markets.  In return, Australia purchased increasing volumes of Korean 
manufactures, initially textiles, clothing and footwear and later automobiles, 
electrical equipment, telecommunications equipment and office machines.  
The expansion in bilateral trade between the two countries was most apparent 
from the mid 1970s.  Total bilateral trade increased from only A$1)6.6 
million in 1965-66 to A$176 million in 1975 and to A$13.8 billion in 2000.  
Growth over the period 1975 to 2000 equated to an annual growth rate of 
19.1 per cent (Kwon, 2001b).  This rapid growth in bilateral trade can be 
linked to two important developments in Korea. First, the diversification of 
resource imports arising from the oil crisis of 1973, and, second, the heavy 
and chemical industries drive during the period of the 1970s (Kwon, 2001b). 
By 1994, Korea had overtaken the US as Australia’s second largest export 
market after Japan. Although the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98 
resulted in a decline in Australian exports to Korea, by 7 per cent in 1997 and 
10 per cent in 1998, imports from Korea remained strong and growing by 28 
per cent and 41 per cent in 1997 and 1998 respectively.  In 1998 Korea was 
still Australia’s third largest export market and fourth largest trading partner. 
In the same year Australia was Korea’s fourth largest import source and fifth 
largest trading partner (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1999b).  
During the period of Korea’s financial and economic crisis the Australian 
government focused upon maintaining trade flows, in particular by 
expanding export credit facilities when commercial suppliers withdrew. This 
                                            
1) A$ stands for Australian dollars. 
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contributed to an expansion in Australia’s share of the Korean import market 
from 3.7 per cent in 1990 to just under 5 per cent in 1998, when Korea’s 
demand for imported manufactured goods declined faster than its demand for 
raw materials and essential foodstuffs (Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1999b).  In the wake of the financial crisis economic 
reforms and market liberalisation in Korea have presented new trade 
opportunities, particularly in manufacturing and services due to corporate and 
financial restructuring (Harvie and Lee, 2003, Harvie, Lee and Oh, 2004, 
Kwon, 2001a).  More contentiously the Australian government has also 
been pressing for greater market access for agricultural products (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999b).  
Over the longer term, however, internal and external pressures are pushing 
both these economies to focus upon knowledge and skill intensive economic 
activities as the basis of their comparative advantages, and this is likely to 
have profound implications for the existing structure of bilateral trade which 
is currently based on complementary economies (Kwon, 2001b).  Australia 
and Korea will wish to focus more upon knowledge intensive exports.  This 
will require Australia to diversify its economic relationship with Korea and to 
demonstrate its capability as an advanced economic society with cutting edge 
technological capacity capable of meeting the needs of Korea.  As Korea 
moves from heavy goods manufacturing to knowledge intensive activities it 
will require less imports of raw materials from Australia (Kwon, 2001b).  
In this context the paper analyses trends in Australia’s trade and 
investment with Korea.  New areas for trade are also highlighted as well as 
prospects for an FTA between the two countries. In doing so it proceeds as 
follows.  Section 2 reviews the Australia-Korea bilateral trade relationship. 
Section 3 reviews the nature and extent of foreign direct investment between 
Australia and Korea.  Section 4 reviews trade and investment prospects and 
opportunities between the two countries.  Section 5 analyses the prospects 
for a Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA).  Section 6 reviews 
the potential economic effects from a KAFTA.  Finally, in section 7, a 
summary of the major points from this paper is presented as well as policy 
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implications.  
 
 
2. AUSTRALIA-KOREA BILATERAL TRADE 
 
In 1994, Korea overtook the US as Australia’s second largest export 
market.  While this ranking slipped during the economic crisis of 1997-1998, 
Korea still remained Australia’s third largest export market after Japan and 
the US, and fourth largest trading partner.  Bilateral trade grew from A$6.6 
million in 1965-1966 to A$10.3 billion in 1998 (see Table 1).  Over the past 
30 years, Australia’s exports to Korea have grown at an annual average rate 
of around 25 per cent per year, one of the fastest growth rates recorded 
amongst Australia’s top 16 export markets (Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1999b).  Imports from Korea have also grown strongly, 
although the trade balance, both merchandise and services, remains in 
Australia’s favour (see Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3).  
 
Table 1  Australia’s Trade with Korea 1993-98, A$ million 
 
Trade A$ million 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Exports 4,359 4,709 6,062 7,305 6,761 6,099 
Exports minus gold 3,893 3,974 4,612 4,423 4,910 4,841 
Imports 1,866 1,766 2,257 2,325 2,966 4,175 
Imports minus gold 1,866 1,766 2,255 2,323 2,806 3,038 
Balance of trade 2,494 2,941 3,805 4,980 3,794 1,924 
Balance of trade minus gold 2,028 2,208 2,357 2,100 2,104 1,803 
Growth rate (%)       
Exports 19.1 8.0 28.8 20.5 -7.4 -9.8 
Export growth excluding gold 17.9 2.1 16.1 -4.1 11.0 -1.4 
Imports 22.8 -5.3 27.8 3.0 27.6 40.8 
Import growth excluding gold 22.8 -5.3 27.7 3.0 20.8 8.3 
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
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Figure 1   
 
 
 
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Australian merchandise trade with Korea, 2003 
 
 
 Total share (%) Rank Growth(yoy) 
Exports to Korea  
(A$ million) 
8,084 7.5 5th -19.0% 
Imports from Korea  
(A$ million)  
4,737 3.6 7th -0.6% 
Total trade (exports+imports) 
(A$ million) 
12,821 5.4 6th -13.1% 
Merchandise trade surplus 
with Korea (A$ million)   
3,347    
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 
Charles Harvie 176
Table 3  Australian trade in services with Korea, 2003 
 
  Total share 
Exports of services to Korea (A$ million) 870 2.7% 
Imports of services from Korea (A$ million) 432 1.3% 
Services trade surplus with Korea (A$ million)  438  
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
2.1. Australian exports to Korea 
 
Throughout the 1990s Australia’s exports to Korea grew steadily, but 
dropped in 1997 with the onset of the financial crisis and then dropped 
sharply again in early 1998 as Korea entered into a severe economic 
recession.  However, Australia’s exports of essential raw materials and basic 
foodstuffs suffered less than most other countries’ exports.  In US dollar 
terms total Korean imports fell 35 per cent in 1998, while Australia’s Korean 
exports were down 22 per cent.  Around 75 per cent of this fall was due to 
declining gold prices. Excluding the gold trade Australia’s exports fell only 
14 per cent in terms of US dollars, a good performance given the size of 
Korea’s import contraction.  The smaller drop in 1998 bilateral trade 
relative to other suppliers highlighted the strong complementarities of the 
two economies, implying demand for Australian exports, particularly raw 
materials and intermediate inputs, would remain strong over the medium to 
long terms (Kwon, 1998). 
Table 4 indicates that Australia’s major export items to Korea are coal, 
crude petroleum, non-monetary gold, iron ore and aluminium.  The further 
inclusion of wool, wood, zinc ore, steel, wheat, sugar and beef account for 75 
per cent of Australia’s exports to Korea. Hence commodities dominate 
Australia’s exports to Korea, the demand for which are strongly influenced 
by the performance of the Korean economy and global commodity prices.  
Coal is the most dominant single item, contributing around 13 per cent of  
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Table 4  Major Australian exports to korea, 2003(A$ million) 
 
Coal 
Crude petroleum 
Non-monetary gold 
Iron ore 
Aluminium 
1,074 
919 
797 
729 
506 
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
merchandise exports, then crude petroleum (11 per cent), non monetary gold 
(10 per cent), iron ore (9 per cent) and aluminium (6 per cent).  These five 
items alone contributed around 50 per cent of merchandise exports.  The 
export of food and live animals accounted for only around 7 per cent of total 
merchandise exports, while the export of manufactured goods contributed 
only 16 per cent.  
 
2.1.1. Commodities 
In the late 1990s Australia provided around 50 per cent of Korea’s coking 
and thermal coal requirements, due to its superior quality to that from China 
and lower transport costs to that from the more distant USA, Canada, South 
Africa and South America.  The demand for coal from Australia is closely 
linked to the performance of the Korean economy and in particular the 
production of steel and electricity.  Future demand for Australian coal will 
be influenced by Korea’s decision regarding the diversification of supply.   
Demand for iron ore will also be influenced by the future performance of the 
economy, particularly in relation to steel production.  By the late 1990s, 
Australia’s market share for iron ore in Korea was around 47 per cent. 
Maintaining this share during the period of economic recovery in Korea 
presented significant opportunities for expanded iron ore exports.  Australia 
is also an important supplier of non-ferrous metals to Korea, principally zinc 
and copper.  Zinc and copper are used extensively in the construction and 
automobiles sectors; thus Korean imports of these metals are tied closely to 
the expected growth rates for these sectors.  With the recovery of the 
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Korean economy the construction and fabrication sector experienced stronger 
growth particularly in infrastructure and housing. 
While demand for raw materials and intermediate inputs should remain 
strong over the medium to long term, the Korean market for commodities is 
likely to become increasingly competitive as foreign investment and 
privatisation reforms increase the competitiveness of Korean industry; 
Australia will not be able to take the market for granted. 
While Koreans remain sensitive about agricultural food imports the market 
is opening slowly to foreign competition, and imports comprise over 40 per 
cent of total food consumed.  Australia is a major supplier of meat, grains, 
sugar, dairy products and wool.  Australia’s share of this market fell after 
1996 mainly driven by falling beef exports.  This was due to falling demand 
in the wake of the financial crisis.  However, under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, Korea agreed to liberalise its beef market, moving from a quota 
system to a tariff only regime by 2001. Prospects remain good for Australian 
beef over the medium to long term when full liberalisation takes place.  But 
agriculture and farm production remains a sensitive issue as discussed in 
more detail below2). 
During the 1970s and 1980s Korea developed a substantial wool textile 
sector, with Australia supplying 50 to 60 per cent of Korea’s wool 
requirements.  However, in the 1990s extensive restructuring of the Korean 
wool textile industry saw production move offshore as demand in the US and 
Japanese markets weakened and high labour costs reduced the viability of 
domestic production.  Since 1995, Australia’s wool exports to Korea have 
declined steadily.  Bankruptcies and excessive wool stocks threaten the 
Korean industry and the market has remained depressed. 
Korea is also an important export market for sugar and wheat. Australia’s 
share of Korea’s sugar market has increased to over 50 per cent. Wheat 
exports have remained volatile, reflecting drought induced supply problems 
in Australia more than market access problems.  By the late 1990s Australia 
                                            
2) See sections 5, 6 and 7 of this paper. 
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supplied around 20 per cent of Korea’s total wheat import market. 
 
2.1.2. Manufactures 
Australia’s manufactured exports to Korea, valued at around A$1.5 billion 
in 2003, comprises both simply transformed manufactures, notably 
aluminium, and elaborately transformed manufactures, dominated by car 
engines.  The economic crisis of 1998 severely impacted upon Korea’s 
imports of aluminium, although imports from Australia were less severely 
affected and consequently increased market share.  With economic recovery 
and subsequent public works spending on infrastructures, demand for 
aluminium recovered.  Demand for Australian exports of aluminium was 
also affected because of reform of the corporate sector in Korea.  In the 
medium term, as excess manufacturing capacity is overcome, housing 
spending recovers, and the construction sector has recovered its growth, 
aluminium demand will also increase.  Over the longer term the prospects 
for Australian aluminium will depend upon it meeting the challenge of 
increased competition, particularly from Russia and South Africa. 
Before the economic crisis in Korea, Australia’s share of elaborately 
transformed manufactured imports grew 20 per cent per year from a 
relatively low base, reaching A$825 million in 1997. Car engines and parts 
grew strongest.  However, with the onset of the crisis in Korea engine 
exports halved to just A$157 million as the Korean domestic market for 
medium sized cars shrunk and export markets remained weak. 
Rationalisation of the Korean car industry under the government’s ‘Big Deal’ 
top five chaebol subsidiary swaps policy, and the improved relative 
competitiveness of domestically made parts through won depreciation have 
made short to medium term prospects uncertain. 
 
2.1.3. Services 
Korea is an important market for Australian service exports, particularly 
educational and tourism services, but Korea’s economic crisis seriously 
affected both (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade , 2003).  
Charles Harvie 180
In 1997-98 Australian service exports to Korea were valued at $702 million, 
a 36 per cent drop on service exports of A$1,098 million in 1996-1997. 
Service imports from Australia were principally freight and shipping. 
In 1997, Australia was the third major destination for Koreans studying 
abroad after the USA and Japan, and Korea was the largest source of 
overseas students studying in Australia.  Almost 20,000 students undertook 
some form of study at Australian institutions, with some 12,000 attending 
English language courses.  In 1997, Korean students paid approximately 
A$350 million to Australian educational suppliers and probably a similar 
amount to live in Australia.  In 1998, however, the economic crisis reduced 
students applying for visas by nearly 30 per cent (Australian Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1998) and the total number of Korean 
students studying in Australia fell by nearly 40 per cent in 1998.  The 
market has recovered, particularly at the postgraduate level, as Koreans value 
education, and, until recently, a depreciation of the Australian dollar 
maintained Australia’s competitiveness. Australia will need to maintain its 
reputation in Korea as a provider of high quality education and, if necessary, 
adjust programs to retain market share to meet the opportunities from the 
recovering market.  
Until 1998, Korea was Australia’s sixth largest source of in-bound tourists 
and Australia’s fastest growing tourism market.  In 1997, 233,000 Korean 
tourists visited Australia, a remarkable increase from the 9,000 visitors in 
1990. However, in 1998, arrivals from Korea fell by a massive 72 per cent, to 
just 66,000.  The Australian Tourism Forecasting Council expected arrivals 
from Korea to recover over the medium to longer term, with visitor numbers 
returning to their 1997 peak by 2006 (Australian Tourism Forecasting 
Council, 1998).  By 2003 tourist figures had returned to around 207,300. 
 
2.2. Australian imports from Korea  
 
Korea is, currently, Australia’s seventh largest source of imports (after the 
USA, Japan, China, Germany, UK and New Zealand).  Until 1998  
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Table 5  Major Australian imports from Korea, 2003(A$ million) 
 
Telecommunications equipment 
Passenger motor vehicles 
Televisions 
Computers 
Non-monetary gold 
965 
502 
298 
264 
197 
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
Table 6  Korea’s principal export destinations, % of total exports 2003 
 
1 China 18.1% 
2 United States 17.7% 
3 Japan 8.9% 
4 Hong Kong 7.6% 
5 Taiwan 3.6% 
11 Australia 1.7% 
Source: IMF 
 
Table 7  Korea’s principal import sources, % of total imports 2003 
 
1 Japan 20.3% 
2 United States 13.9% 
3 China 12.3% 
4 Saudi Arabia 5.2% 
5 Germany 3.8% 
6 Australia 3.3% 
Source: IMF 
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manufactures comprised 80 to 90 per cent of Australia’s Korean imports, 
falling to 65 per cent in the crisis year of 1998.  By 2003, 74 per cent of 
merchandise imports were manufactured goods, chemicals 5 per cent, gold 
18 per cent and non manufactures 3 per cent.  Cars, computers, 
telecommunications equipment, household electrical and electronic 
appliances remain the most important Korean exports to Australia (see Table 
5).  Korea is now second only to Japan as an exporter of passenger vehicles 
to Australia.  This illustrates the potential for market penetration of high 
quality and competitively priced Korean manufactures.  Imports of textiles, 
clothing and footwear have lost market share to other suppliers, principally 
China, although they still comprised around 6 per cent of Korean exports to 
Australia. 
From a Korean perspective, Australia remains an important trading partner. 
It represents the country’s eleventh principal export destination and sixth 
most important source of imports (see Tables 6 and 7).  Given the obvious 
complementarities between them, both in terms of their economic and trading 
structures, there are good prospects for an expansion of inter-industry trade. 
 
 
3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BETWEEN  
AUSTRALIA AND KOREA 
 
Australia-Korea bilateral investment flows have not matched the level of 
trade (Bishop, 2001).  By the late 1990s Korea was only Australia’s 
eighteenth largest overseas investment destination and Korean companies 
were the sixteenth largest investor in Australia.  Australia gives high priority 
to encouraging increased Korean investment in Australia, particularly in 
manufacturing, tourism and resources.  This policy produced some results, 
with direct and portfolio investment increasing to around A$1.5 billion 
before the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. The bulk of this was 
portfolio investment, rather than longer term FDI.  
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3.1. Australian FDI in Korea 
 
Australia’s cumulative FDI in Korea is small.  Korean data suggest that 
by the end of the 1990s Australian cumulative investment stood at US$38 
million, while Australian data suggested that the figure was A$94 million. 
Such investment is principally in the manufacturing and service sectors, 
although the transport, chemicals and electrical and electronics sectors have 
also been recipients.  Australian FDI into the Korean service sector has 
diversified with consulting, market research, travel agencies and advertising 
growing in recent years. In the past, Korean emigrants to Australia also 
undertook some hotel and trading company investments.  Australia’s 
Korean FDI increased with the opening of the service sector, particularly 
financial services, in the wake of the financial crisis.  Investments in 
consulting and market research have also continued to grow as the Korean 
market recovered from the crisis. 
A survey conducted by Lee (1998) using 24 Australian and other foreign 
companies operating in Korea suggested that most of those surveyed were 
satisfied with their investment.  Of managers surveyed, 75 per cent 
indicated that their companies were either very or reasonably satisfied with 
profitability, while 25 per cent were disappointed.  
The major factors leading these companies to initially invest in Korea were 
its large domestic market and expected economic growth in new markets (see 
Table 8).  Another important motive for investing in Korea was to develop a 
local presence as part of the company’s overall globalisation strategy. Two 
thirds of surveyed companies considered the major impediments to 
conducting doing business in Korea were: foreign exchange risk; difficulty in 
dealing with the bureaucracy; and problems in obtaining information from 
government and regulatory bodies. Other major impediments included 
chaebol dominance of the domestic market, Korea’s strong nationalism, 
Korean business culture and corruption. Despite these negatives, 75 per cent 
of surveyed companies would encourage other Australian companies to 
invest in Korea.  
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Table 8  Survey of why Australian companies wish to invest in Korea 
 
Description of motives behind the initial decision to invest 
Major reason 
(number of responses) 
Per cent 
Already a major market and local presence important 16 66 
Part of company’s globalisation strategy 9 38 
Explore a new market 4 16 
Establish a beachhead for market expansion 3 12 
Approached by Korea partner 1 4 
Produce products for export to third market 0 0 
Increase productivity by using low cost labour 0 0 
Acquire local technology 0 0 
Note: Companies were given the opportunity to provide more than one motive behind their 
initial decision to invest in Korea. Thus, responses add to more than 24 and percentages 
to more than 100. 
Sourc: Lee (1998). 
 
 
3.2. Korean FDI in Australia  
 
Korean data indicates that Korean FDI in Australia grew strongly from a 
low base of about US$52 million in 1996 to US$100 million by the end of 
the 1990s.  While such FDI was diversified into many sectors it was mainly 
aimed at securing a stable supply of energy and natural resources (Kwon and 
Oh, 2001).  Half of it was concentrated in coal mining, then forestry and 
fishery (see Figure 2). 
Most mining investment is in production sharing joint ventures, but a few 
wholly owned subsidiaries also operate.  Many large Korean corporations in 
mining-related business, including Samsung, SK, POSCO and KEPCO, have 
invested in Australia, producing coal for their parent companies in Korea. 
Korea’s major general trading companies have also established wholly 
owned subsidiaries or representative offices in Australia. They import Korean 
merchandise such as chemical products, steel products, heavy machinery and  
The Australia-Korea Economic Relationship and Prospects for an FTA 
 
185
 
Figure 2  Sectoral distribution of Korean FDI in Australia (cumulative,  
1968-98, per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Based on actual investments. 
Source: Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy (1998). 
 
semiconductors into Australia, and export goods including coal, iron ore, 
gold, non-ferrous metals and wool from Australia.  Other trading companies, 
mostly chaebol subsidiaries, import Korean cars, household white goods and 
home electronics for wholesale or retail distribution in Australia. 
Although investment in the Australian manufacturing sector is still small, it is 
expanding and diversifying into new products with some major investments 
in wool and leather processing and chemical products. Other sectors include 
construction and real estate investments.  While these are relatively new 
areas for Korean overseas direct investment, such investment is expected to 
increase substantially in the future (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 1999b). 
 
Trading
29%
Manufacturing
8%
Forestry
2%
Construction
2%
Others
10%
Mining
49%
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4. TRADE AND INVESTMENT PROSPECTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
From an Australian perspective, Korea’s period of economic reform in the 
wake of the financial crisis has created many new export and investment 
opportunities, as trade is liberalised and FDI in Korea expands.  In addition, 
improved financial and corporate sector accountability, transparency and the 
improving regulatory environment make it easier for Australian firms to do 
business.  Market opportunities for Australian firms are opening in 
technology dependent sectors, such as automotive components, finance and 
banking, but also in bulk commodity sectors.  Since the crisis, with a view 
to cutting costs, Korean importers have reviewed supply arrangements with 
traditional suppliers in the USA and Europe.  As competition in the Korean 
marketplace has increased, price and quality rather than traditional 
relationships will increasingly determine input sourcing.  This presents a 
good opportunity for Australian companies. 
The following sectors provide excellent trade opportunities for Australian 
exporters in the post crisis recovery of the Korean economy: 
 
z Industrial raw materials (energy, raw materials and intermediate inputs). 
Australian companies meet many Korean import needs for raw materials 
and basic foodstuffs.  Australia's traditional trade in energy resources 
with Korea, worth A$6 billion, is set to grow as Korea's demand for energy 
rises. Coal is a critical requirement for Korean industry and LNG is the 
next strategic fuel for Korea's economic growth.  In both energy 
resources, Australia is a major world player and has the capacity and 
experience to be a reliable supplier to meet South Korean energy needs.  
South Korea's National Energy Plan, which sets out the country's energy 
policies and requirements until 2011, projects an increase in demand for 
LNG of 4.8 per cent annually.  Australia is in a good position to be able 
to meet Korea's energy demands well into the future.  In January 2003, 
Australia won a contract to supply South Korea with more than 3 million 
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tons of LNG over seven years.  The contract, worth about A$1 billion, is 
indicative of the confidence Korea has in Australia's long record as a 
reliable, stable and competitive supplier of South Korea's energy needs.  
z Processed food and beverages. As the Korean economy continues its 
economic growth demand for beef, especially with full liberalisation, will 
rise, as with dairy products, wine and beer, seafoods and other western 
foods.  Since August 2002, Australia has successfully exported 
approximately 3,900 live cattle to Korea in 5 consignments between 
August 2002 and December 2003.  The cattle are prepared in accordance 
with South Korean import conditions and are being released to local 
farmers following the mandatory post arrival quarantine period.  
z Automotive components. Over the longer term the automotive sector 
presents many mutually beneficial trade opportunities.  Despite Korea’s 
considerable automotive manufacturing capacity, its component sector is 
relatively weak technologically.  The development of an independent 
automotive technological capacity remains a high priority and Korean 
firms are seeking strategic technological alliances with other countries, 
including Australia (Austrade, 1999). 
z Information technology and other high technology products and services.  
Australian suppliers of software applications for the banking and financial 
services sector could face significant opportunities.  Korea’s reform and 
modernisation of its banking system has required a major upgrade of its 
information technology infrastructure.  Australian companies are well 
placed to take advantage of emerging financial sector IT opportunities, 
particularly where Australian IT firms have developed leading edge 
technology in market segments.  However, Australia needs to market 
aggressively these advantages to attract Korean customers who may not be 
aware that Australia is a major source of financial and professional 
services.  A study commissioned by the Australia-Korea Foundation in 
2001, Australia-Korea: Strengthened Economic Partnership, showed that 
there are emerging new fields for strengthening the economic relationship, 
particularly in public infrastructure development, IT broadband access and 
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technology-based services.  South Korea has the highest rate of 
broadband uptake in the world, with approximately sixty per cent of 
households using the technology.  However while South Korea leads the 
world in terms of infrastructure roll-out, Australia's expertise in the 
development of broadband applications would be of great benefit to Korea 
in its effort to stimulate market demand in industry sectors.  In May 2003, 
a Broadband Summit was held in Australia bringing together industry 
leaders from both countries to explore collaboration in information 
technology and broadband applications.  
z Building materials. Opportunities exist in detached residential housing, 
building materials, project management services, building and urban 
development services, waste management services and the supply of kit 
homes. 
z Environmental services. Australian environmental engineering 
companies have experience in industrial waste-water treatment in Korea.  
Water supply and other urban infrastructure projects with strong 
environmental components are likely to form part of employment creation 
and macroeconomic stimulus public works projects.  In the medium to 
long term, Korea is likely to increase funding for environmental 
improvement projects. 
z Medical equipment and biotechnology. Since the economic crisis 
traditional supply channels have forced Korean hospitals to re-assess their 
purchasing decisions.  US products are now more expensive, so 
alternatives need to be sought. Australian suppliers need to cultivate 
relationships with purchasing departments of hospitals, distributors and 
agents, and demonstrate the quality and capacity of Australian products 
(Austrade, 1999). 
z Distribution. In the wake of the financial crisis a new distribution 
environment is appearing in Korea. Australian exporters have 
opportunities to supply new multinational retailers by stressing Australian 
goods as being high quality and value for money products. 
z Tourism and education. Tourism and education remain important 
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elements of the bilateral services trade.  The South Korean student 
market is Australia's third largest, and more than 207,300 South Korean 
tourists visited Australia in 2003. 
 
From Korea’s perspective the Australian market has many potential trade 
and investment opportunities.  Australia has, for a number of years, been 
one of the fastest growing OECD economies.  Rising incomes and wealth 
have created a market with considerable opportunities for Korea companies, 
particularly in terms of telecommunications equipment, passenger motor 
vehicles, televisions and computers.  Australians have a reputation for being 
willing to try new high tech products that enter the market.  Being able to 
compete in the Australian market on an equal footing with more expensive 
Japanese and US products is therefore crucial for Korean companies.  The 
prospect of a free trade agreement between Australia and the US could put 
Korean companies at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
 
5. PROSPECTS FOR A KOREA-AUSTRALIA FTA 
 
As discussed, there are many potential opportunities for expanding trade 
and investment flows between the two economies for mutual benefit.  The 
numerous obvious complementarities between these economies, and their 
relatively small contribution to each other’s total imports, suggests that they 
are potentially ideal partners for a free trade agreement.  This section 
explores the prospects for the establishment of a Korea-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (KAFTA) and the prospective obstacles to its attainment. 
 
5.1. Key Factors Behind a Successful FTA 
 
When Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited Korea in May 2000, 
he proposed to the then Korean President Kim Dae-jung that the two 
countries form a free trade agreement to further expand bilateral trade and 
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investment ties (Korean Herald, 20 May 2000).  The success of a bilateral 
free trade agreement depends on the economic size, economic systems, 
willingness and commitment of the countries involved, existing trade barriers, 
and complementarities and competition between the two economies (Kwon, 
2001).  The Australian and Korean economies are of comparable size and 
hence the benefits of an FTA should not be skewed to either one of these 
economies. Both economies should also be compatible for an FTA as they 
have engaged in extensive reform of their economies involving deregulation 
and liberalisation, and both have pursued outward-looking economic policies.  
Both countries have also been strong supporters of the multilateral trading 
system and its objectives.  However, tariff and non-tariff barriers remain 
high between the two countries. 
Bilateral trade between Australia and Korea accounts for a small portion of 
their respective world trade.  Bilateral trade between the two countries 
accounted for about 2.8 per cent of Korea’s total trade during the period of 
the 1990s.  During the same decade the amount of bilateral trade with Korea 
accounted for about 5.5 per cent of Australia’s world trade.  Both Korea and 
Australia depend heavily on the rest of the world, and hence they should 
organise a non-discriminatory, open free trade agreement. 
 
5.2. Korean Motivations and Concerns from a KAFTA 
 
A number of potential benefits arising from the establishment of a KAFTA 
can be identified for Korea.  First, it would enable Korea to overcome 
Australian tariff and non-tariff barriers that have been problematic for some 
Korean exports, and secure their access to the Australian market.  Although 
the average tariff rate for Australia is 5 per cent, major exported goods from 
Korea face higher tariff rates.  For example, Australia has tariff rates of 20 
per cent for automobiles and parts, and 20-30 per cent tariff rates for textiles, 
clothing and footwear (Cheong, 1999).  Australia has increased its use of 
trade remedy laws such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties to restrict 
foreign imports, and there is no guarantee that it would not expand their use 
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more often on Korean goods (Kwon, 2001).  
Second, a KAFTA would enable Korean firms secure access to Australia’s 
abundant natural resources and agricultural products.  Given the current 
structure of its economy, Korea is heavily dependent on foreign mineral and 
energy resources.  It would, therefore, be interested in securing access to 
Australian mineral resources not only through freer trade but also through 
investment opportunities.  In addition, some agricultural products such as 
cotton, wool and sugar are used as intermediate goods for Korea’s 
manufacturing sector.  A KAFTA would also secure Korean access to these 
inputs. 
Finally, a KAFTA could encourage Australian FDI.  As noted previously, 
two-way FDI has remained at low levels.  Australian investment in Korea 
accounts for a very small proportion of Australian global FDI.  One 
important reason for this is the fact that there are few areas in which 
Australian firms have a comparative advantage in Korea.  A KAFTA, 
however, would open up the Korean services sector and provide significant 
advantage for Australian companies, providing them with an incentive to 
invest in the Korean services sector. 
The key area of concern for Korea, and the major obstacle to the 
establishment of a KAFTA, is Korea’s agricultural sector.3)  A KAFTA will 
require significant improvements in efficiency and major restructuring of the 
agricultural sector.  Most Australian agricultural exports to Korea, with the 
exception of items such as beef and live animals, complement Korean 
agriculture in the sense that some are not produced in Korea, while others 
(fruit, beverages and horticultural products) are produced in different seasons.  
Nevertheless, potentially adverse effects arising from a KAFTA would 
produce considerable resistance to it from the politically strong agricultural 
sector in Korea.  In 2000 Korea imported US$8.1 billion of agricultural 
products compared to production of US$20 billion by the domestic 
                                            
3) The author is grateful to an anonymous referee in emphasising this point. 
 
Charles Harvie 192
agriculture sector.  Agricultural imports from Australia amounted to 
US$706 million, thereby accounting for 8.7 per cent of total agricultural 
exports in 2000, and making it the third largest source of agriculture imports 
after China (with a market share of 21 per cent) and the US (with a market 
share of 19.5 per cent) in 2000.  From a Korean perspective this large share 
of imports from Australia indicates the concern that Korea would have from 
opening up its agriculture sector through a KAFTA.  In addition, once it is 
open to Australia, it would be difficult to restrict agricultural imports from 
other countries. Under the rules of the WTO the establishment of an FTA 
means that members of the FTA cannot raise barriers to trade against non-
members, and should be open for additional membership.  Under these 
conditions Korea would have to confront serious difficulties with regard to 
the agricultural sector from the establishment of an FTA with Australia.  
This difficulty goes a substantial way in explaining why neither Australia nor 
Korea have been pushing hard for a KAFTA. 
 
5.3. Australian motivations and concerns from a KAFTA 
 
The establishment of a KAFTA would be of interest to Australia for a 
number of reasons.  First, it would secure access to the Korean market for 
its traditional export products and provide opportunities for the expansion of 
other goods and services exports.  After the financial crisis Korea engaged 
in an import liberalisation policy, but despite this Korean tariffs have 
remained relatively high.  The average tariff rate on Australian goods was 
9.1 per cent as of 1998, although its average tariff rate declined to 8.3 per 
cent by 2004 under its commitment to the WTO.  While tariffs on imports 
of mineral products have been low, 3.6 per cent in 1998, Korean tariffs on 
agricultural and food products, which are of primary importance to Australia, 
ranged from 11.3 per cent on fats and oils to 19.8 per cent on prepared food.   
Korea continues to use adjustment duties to limit disruptions to domestic 
markets from imports, and the rates of these adjustment duties can be higher 
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or lower than those shown in the tariff schedule.  Korea still imposes non-
tariff barriers, particularly on commodities that are of interest to Australia. 
For example quarantine restrictions and customs related impediments, 
particularly for horticulture, animal and dairy products. 
Second, Korea could be used as a base by Australian firms to break into 
markets in Northeast Asia and other East Asian countries (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999a).  The possible 
establishment of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Korea), with Australia 
excluded, and Korea’s movement towards the establishment of free trade 
agreements with a number of countries, would make a KAFTA a useful 
means for Australia to achieve closer economic relations with other East 
Asian countries that might otherwise be unattainable. 
Third, Australia would be concerned with the potential for trade diversion 
of products in which Australia has a comparative advantage should Korea 
negotiate other successful FTAs.  For example, an FTA with the US could 
displace Australia agricultural and mineral products by US equivalents in the 
Korean market.  Should a Korea-Japan free trade agreement eventuate 
Australia would also be in danger of losing to Japan the Korean market for its 
manufactured goods such as automobile engines.  
Fourth, the Korean services market offers considerable potential for 
Australia, since the country has a comparative advantage in such services.  
Korea’s services sector has been liberalising as a result of Korea’s Uruguay 
Round negotiations in 1994 and accession to the OECD in 1996.  
Additional liberalisation of its services sector took place after the 1997 
financial crisis as a way of increasing efficiency and attracting more FDI.  
As a result, with the exception of a few wholly restricted and partially 
restricted categories related to national security, culture and primary 
producers’ special position, most services businesses, including transport, 
communications, finance, insurance and business services, are now open to 
FDI and competition.  A KAFTA would facilitate the expansion of 
Australian services to Korea in a number of these areas. 
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6. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS FROM A KAFTA 
 
The net gains from an FTA depend on whether the agreement generates 
trade creation effects that improve welfare, or generates trade diversion 
effects that lower welfare.  Trade creation occurs when member country X 
imports from member country Y a product that was sourced locally in 
country X before the establishment of the FTA.  This would occur if the 
protection structure in country X before the FTA raised the price of imports 
above the domestic production price, making it previously cheaper to source 
the product locally.  Welfare will increase since country X now imports the 
good from a lower cost source.  On the other hand, trade diversion occurs 
when the FTA causes member country X to import a product from member 
country Y that it previously had imported from a lower cost non-member 
country.  The FTA causes the country to import from a higher cost supplier, 
thus decreasing welfare.  The more divergent the patterns of comparative 
advantage across member are, the greater is the presumption that there exists 
room for trade creation with the formation of an FTA.  Alternatively, similar 
patterns of comparative advantage across member countries implies that 
there is a greater possibility of trade diversion. 
 
6.1. Studies on the benefit of a KAFTA 
 
In the literature, apart from the studies by Cheong (1999) and Kim and 
Cheong (1996), no quantitative assessments have been conducted measuring 
the impact of an FTA between Australia and Korea.  According to the study 
conducted by Kim and Cheong (1996) a KAFTA would have increased 
Korean and Australian GDP in 1992 by 0.76 per cent and 0.72 per cent, 
respectively, through the elimination of tariffs between the two countries.  
However, Korea’s total exports to Australia amounted to only US$1.1 billion 
in 1992, or about 0.3 per cent of Korea’s GDP.  Consequently, the relatively 
tiny share of exports to Australia suggests that the extent of the benefit 
estimated by Kim and Cheong (1996) is questionable. According to Cheong 
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(1999), based upon the quantitative results obtained in the Kim and Cheong 
(1996) study, in 1992 Australian exports to Korea would have increased by 
US$3.4 billion, or 109.7 per cent of Australia’s total exports to Korea valued 
at US$3.1 billion in that year, and Korea’s exports to Australia would have 
increased by US$1.6 billion, or 145.5 per cent of Korea’s total exports to 
Australia of US$1.1 billion in that year.  These estimates of the impact of a 
KAFTA on bilateral trade appear to be unrealistically large (see Kwon 
(2001)). 
While the study of Kim and Cheong (1996) produced highly aggregated 
estimates of KAFTA’s economic effects, Kwon (2001) adopted a sectoral 
level approach to identify if significant trade creation effects exist between 
Korea and Australia.  In doing so he uses the concept of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) (see Balassa, 1965). RCA calculations are 
used to analyse trade complementarity and competition between two 
countries, which, in this case, can be applied to identify possible effects of a 
KAFTA for both Australia and Korea.  While the RCA technique does not 
provide a complete analysis of bilateral trade creation and trade diversion, it 
does provide a relatively disaggregated look at sectors that are likely to 
generate significant impacts under a KAFTA. 
Using the RCA technique two indices can be calculated. First, the revealed 
comparative advantage of exports (RCAX) is represented by a country’s 
commodity composition of exports relative to the commodity composition of 
world exports.  
 
The RCAX index is defined as: 
 
RCAXkj = (Xkj/Xkt) )(Xwj/Xwt) = (Xkj/Xwj) ) (Xkt/Xwt). 
 
wre; Xkj represents the value of country k’s exports of commodity j 
Xkt represents the value of country k’s total exports 
Xwj represents the value of world exports of commodity j 
Xwt represents the value of total world exports of all commodities. 
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If the index exceeds unity then the country has a revealed comparative 
advantage in commodity j.  Similarly, if the index has a value less than unity 
then this implies that the country does not have a revealed comparative 
advantage in commodity j. 
A revealed comparative advantage of imports (RCAM) index, representing 
a country’s import composition relative to the world total, can be defined as: 
 
RCAMkj = (Mkj/Mkt) )(Mwj/Mwt) = (Mkj/Mwj) ) (Mkt/Mwt) 
 
where: Mkj represents the value of country k’s imports of commodity j 
Mkt represents the value of country k’s total imports 
Mwj represents the value of world imports of commodity j 
Mwt represents the value of total world imports of all commodities 
 
An RCAM value of greater than unity implies that country k has a revealed 
comparative advantage in its importation of commodity j, or a revealed 
comparative disadvantage in commodity j.  Where the RCAM value is less 
than unity, the country would be said to not have a revealed comparative 
advantage in importing that product. 
Kwon (2001) then uses RCA to determine whether bilateral trade between 
Australia and Korea is complementary or competing on a cross sectional 
basis. He then uses these results to assess whether a KAFTA is likely to lead 
to bilateral trade creation. 
RCAX and RCAM indices are calculated for all products at the three digit 
SITC level for the years 1995 and 1998 for both Australia and Korea.  
Calculations of RCAX and RCAM presented are limited to those products 
for which values of exports and imports are reported for Australia, Korea and 
the World. The following case results are presented: 
 
Case 1 Complementarities between Australian exports (RCAXaus >1) and 
Korean imports  (RCAMkor > 1) 
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Case 2 Complementarities between Korean exports (RCAXkor > 1) and 
Australian imports (RCAMaus > 1) 
 
Case 3 Product categories where Australian (RCAXaus > 1) and Korea 
exports RCAXkor > 1) compete 
 
Case 4 Sectors in which Australia has a comparative advantage in both 
exports (RCAXaus > 1) and imports (RCAMaus > 1) 
 
Case 5 Sectors in which Korea has a comparative advantage in both exports 
(RCAXkor > 1) and imports (RCAMkor > 1) 
 
 
Table 9  Case 1-Complementarity between Australian Exports and  
Korean Imports 
 
  Australian Exports 
(RCAXaus > 1) 
Korean Imports 
(RCAMkor > 1)
Share of Aus. 
total exports (%) 
SITC Commodity 1995 1998 1995 1998 1998 
041 Wheat etc. unmilled 7.176 14.590 0.990 2.383 3.95 
081 Animal feedstuff 1.404 1.506 0.947 1.281 0.59 
211 Hides, skins, (excluding furskins), raw 5.626 6.507 6.010 7.008 0.57 
222 Oil seeds for ‘soft’ fixed vegetable oils 0.591 1.748 1.362 1.723 0.46 
263 Cotton 4.308 9.106 2.513 2.829 1.76 
281 Iron ore & concentrates 24.831 24.157 2.635 3.825 4.48 
287 Ores and concentrates of base metal, nes 14.878 19.260 1.536 2.989 6.54 
288 Non ferrous scrap metal, nes 1.669 1.500 1.607 1.287 0.22 
322 Coal lignite and peat 26.448 30.651 3.467 5.816 11.04 
334 Petroleum products, refined 1.054 1.036 1.624 0.170 1.78 
533 Pigments, paints etc. 1.421 1.342 0.999 1.047 0.54 
611 Leather 2.157 1.930 1.400 1.215 0.51 
672 Iron, steel primary forms 1.958 1.929 3.065 1.278 0.88 
682 Copper  1.857 1.238 1.896 2.694 0.65 
684 Aluminium 4.307 4.719 1.719 1.680 3.82 
793 Ships and boats etc. 0.738 1.229 3.623 1.241 0.95 
882 Photo, cinema supplies 1.389 1.424 1.195 1.513 0.45 
Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook (1999). 
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Table 10  Case 2-Complementarity between Korean Exports and  
Australian Imports 
 
  Korean Exports 
(RCAXkor > 1) 
Australian Imports
(RCAMaus > 1) 
Share of Korean 
total exports (%) 
SITC Commodity 1995 1998 1995 1998 1998 
513 Carboxylic acids etc. 1.625 1.884 0.953 na 0.53 
582 Plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of 
plastics 
1.758 1.694 1.082 0.006 0.91 
583 Polymerisation etc. products na 2.095 0.742 na 2.79 
625 Rubber tyres, inner tubes etc. na 2.483 1.863 na 1.17 
653 Woven man made fibre fabrics 7.999 6.477 0.937 1.016 3.49 
658 Textile articles nes 1.224 0.830 1.389 0.964 0.23 
678 Wire of iron or steel 1.023 1.112 1.094 0.556 0.56 
682 Copper 0.499 1.705 0.529 1.155 0.90 
723 Civil engineering equipment etc. 1.136 0.941 2.656 0.860 0.49 
724 Textile, leather machinery 1.242 1.018 0.777 2.637 0.38 
752 Automatic data processing equipment 1.274 1.158 1.553 0.119 3.43 
761 Television receivers 3.416 1.949 1.172 0.392 0.86 
762 Radio broadcast receivers 1.626 0.569 1.088 10.634 0.18 
763 Sound recorders, phonographs 3.429 2.108 1.132 1.178 0.80 
764 Telecommunications equipment nes 1.438 1.251 1.335 0.197 3.44 
775 Household type equipment nes 2.035 1.972 1.312 0.699 1.30 
778 Electrical machinery nes 2.846 0.619 1.220 0.209 0.90 
781 Passenger motor vehicles 1.242 1.248 1.168 0.120 6.50 
793 Ships and boats etc. 6.050 7.869 2.736 0.453 6.06 
831 Travel goods and handbags 1.874 0.998 1.308 1.093 0.27 
845 Textile fabric apparel 1.508 1.238 0.609 2.685 0.97 
898 Musical instruments 1.876 1.256 1.893 1.201 0.73 
899 Other manufactured goods 1.371 0.967 1.317 2.678 0.36 
Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook (1999). 
 
The results for Case 1 are presented in Table 9.  This shows the product 
categories in which Australia’s export specialisation (RCAXaus larger than 
unity) match Korea’s import specialisation (RCAMkor larger than unity). 
Seventeen product categories, representing 39.2 per cent of Australia’s total  
exports in 1998, are complementary with Korean imports.  Major sectors of 
complementarity of Australian exports, which account for a significant share 
(more than 1 per cent) of total Australian exports, include, not surprisingly, 
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raw agricultural products (wheat and cotton), and mineral products (iron ore, 
base metal ores, coal and petroleum products). 
The results for Case 2 are presented in Table 10.  This shows the product 
categories in which Korea’s export specialisation (RCAXkor larger than 
unity) match Australia’s import specialisation (RCAMaus larger than unity).  
Major sectors of complementarity of Korean exports, which account for a  
significant share (more than 1 per cent) of total Korea exports, include some 
chemical products (polymerisation products), some basic manufactures 
(rubber tyres, man made fibre fabric), and machines and transportation 
equipment (automatic data equipment, telecommunications equipment, 
household equipment, transistors, passenger motor vehicles and ships and 
boats etc.).  For the case of Korea, 37.3 per cent of its total exports are 
complementary with Australian imports. 
 
Table 11  Case 3 Product Categories in Which Australian and Korean  
Exports Compete 
 
  
Australian Exports
(RCAXaus > 1) 
Korean Exports 
(RCAXkor > 1) 
Share of Aus. total 
exports (%) 
Share of Korean 
total exports (%) 
SITC Commodity 1995 1998 1995 1998 1998 1998 
334 Petroleum 
products, refined 
1.054 1.036 1.009 1.921 1.78 3.29 
611 Leather 2.157 1.930 4.053 3.326 0.51 0.88 
672 Iron and steel 
primary forms 
1.958 1.929 1.746 2.420 0.88 1.11 
682 Copper  1.857 1.238 0.499 1.705 0.65 0.90 
793 Ships and boats 
etc. 
0.738 1.229 6.050 7.869 0.95 6.06 
Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook (1999). 
 
The results for Case 3 are shown in Table 11, which shows the extent of 
competition between Australian and Korean exports in world markets.  
These are the product categories in which both Australia and Korea have 
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RCAX indices higher than unity.  These reflect intra-industry trade, where 
Australia and Korea export the same products in significant quantities to the 
world market, including each other’s markets.  There are only a few product 
categories in which Australia and Korea are competing in world markets.  
They are petroleum products, leather, iron and steel in primary forms, 
copper products, and ships and boats, representing 12.2 per cent and 4.7 per 
cent respectively, of Korean and Australian total exports in 1998.  This 
finding indicates that the two economies are in competition with each other 
in the world market only for a very limited number of products. 
Case 4 results are shown in Table 12. This shows the extent of domestic 
intra industry trade within an economy.  This type of domestic intra industry 
trade is reflected in a country exporting a product as well as importing that 
same product in significant quantities. Significant intra industry 
specialisation will yield high RCAX and RCAM indices for the same product 
categories of a country.  There are only three product categories in which 
Australia has RCAX and RCAM both larger than unity.  They are copper 
products, ships and boats and photo cinema supplies.  Exports of these 
products amounted to 2.4 per cent of total Australian exports in 1998.  This 
reflects the simple industrial and trade structures of the Australian economy, 
which exports mainly agricultural and mineral products and imports mainly 
manufactured products. 
Case 5 results are shown in Table 13.  This indicates that Korea has more 
extensive domestic intra industry trade.  RCAX and RCMX are larger than 
unity for 17 product categories. These are refined petroleum products, some 
chemical products, some basic manufactures, and some machinery and 
transport equipment, representing 40.2 per cent of total Korean exports in 
1998.  This indicates that Korean industrial and trade structures are more 
diversified than in the Australian economy, suggesting that in the non 
traditional trading industries Korea may be more likely to take advantage of 
trade liberalisation from a KAFTA as compared to Australia. 
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Table 12  Case 4-Sectors in Which Australia has a Comparative   
Advantage in both Exports and Imports 
 
  Australian Exports 
(RCAXaus > 1) 
Australian Imports 
(RCAMaus > 1) 
Share of Aus. 
total exports (%) 
SITC Commodity 1995 1998 1995 1998 1998 
682 Copper  1.857 1.238 0.529 1.115 0.65 
793 Ships and boats etc. 0.738 1.229 0.529 1.115 0.65 
882 Photo, cinema supplies 1.389 1.424 1.771 1.090 0.45 
SourceS Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook. 
 
Table 13  Case 4-Sectors in which Korea has a Comparative Advantage 
in Both Exports and Imports 
 
  Korean Exports 
(RCAXkor > 1) 
Korean Imports 
(RCAMkor > 1)
Share of Korean 
total exports (%) 
SITC Commodity 1995 1998 1995 1998 1998 
334 Petroleum products, refined 1.009 1.921 1.624 0.170 3.29 
511 Hydrocarbons nes, derivatives 2.312 3.489 3.109 3.109 0.98 
513 Carboxylic acids etc. 1.625 1.884 0.953  0.53 
582 Plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics 1.758 1.694 1.202 1.260 0.91 
611 Leather 4.053 3.326 1.400 1.215 0.88 
651 Textile yarn 1.584 4.053 1.866 1.775 1.176 
653 Woven man made fibre fabrics 7.999 6.477 0.937 1.016 3.49 
654 Other woven textile fabrics 1.621 1.404 1.841 1.617 0.25 
672 Iron, steel primary forms 1.746 2.420 3.065 1.278 1.11 
673 
Flat rolled products of iron or non-alloy 
steel 
0.845 1.709 1.278 0.593 0.77 
674 Iron, steel universal plate sheet 1.875 2.860 1.050 0.829 2.74 
682 Copper 0.499 1.705 1.896 2.694 0.90 
724 Textile, leather machinery 1.242 1.018 1.775 0.763 0.38 
776 
Transistors, valves etc. 4.295 40.72
0 
2.051 3.824 14.674 
778 Electrical machinery nes 2.846 0.619 0.797 1.030 0.90 
793 Ships and boats etc. 6.050 7.869 3.623 1.241 6.06 
871 Optical instruments 1.256 4.658 2.140 2.999 1.13 
Source: Kwon (2001) based on calculations from the UN International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook (1999). 
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7. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A KAFTA 
 
The Australian and Korean economies are highly complementary for 
numerous products, and are in direct competition for only a limited number 
of products.  For Australia, 39.2 per cent of its exports are complementary 
with Korea, and only 4.7 per cent of its exports are in competition with Korea.  
In the case of Korea, 37.3 per cent of its exports are complementary with 
Australia, while 12.2 per cent of them are in competition with Australia.  
Hence, based on the current economic and trading structures of each 
economy, there are large potential opportunities for inter-industry trade 
creation from the formation of a KAFTA.  However, as both economies face 
changing structures towards knowledge based economies there could be even 
further inter industry opportunities for expanded trade in the future.  In the 
new knowledge based economies of Korea and Australia the former is likely 
to specialise in knowledge based manufacturing activities, while Australia is 
likely to specialise in knowledge based service activities. 
Despite apparently high levels of complementarity and low levels of 
competition between the two economies, a KAFTA should not be considered 
as a substitute for multilateral trade liberalisation by the two countries.  
Bilateral trade between the two accounts for only a small proportion of their 
respective world trade, indicating that both are heavily dependent upon the 
rest of the world.  Therefore, both should continue to pursue a multilateral 
trade liberalisation agenda within the context of the WTO.  The low extent 
of competition is also not necessarily desirable in conjunction with the 
formation of a KAFTA, as it may indicate few opportunities for intra-
industry trade creation.  The existing industrial and trade structures of the 
two economies has contributed to underdeveloped intra-industry trade 
between them, particularly in the manufacturing and high technology areas, 
suggesting that the establishment of a KAFTA would have limited potential 
for intra-industry trade expansion.  In particular, the Australian industrial 
structure is not sufficiently diversified to take full advantage of opportunities 
arising in the knowledge-based sectors.  However, such trade could become 
The Australia-Korea Economic Relationship and Prospects for an FTA 
 
203
more important in the future as restructuring moves these economies towards 
their objective of becoming more knowledge based.  
Another benefit from the establishment of a KAFTA is an increase in 
inflows of FDI. Since both economies are relatively small a KAFTA is 
unlikely to attract significant amounts of FDI to establish production bases 
within them.  However, with both Australia and Korea attempting to 
establish other regional free trade agreements with neighbouring countries, a 
KAFTA region could become part of a larger regional trade bloc.  This 
could attract FDI into the region to develop raw materials in Australia or to 
develop a foothold in a broad Northeast Asian economic region. 
Another advantage of a KAFTA for both countries is that it could provide 
a useful experiment about the benefits arising from the formation of an FTA. 
As the economies are similar in size and their bilateral trade accounts for a 
small proportion of their respective world trade, disruption from the 
formation of a KAFTA on their respective economies may not be high.  
Since the objective of a KAFTA is to reduce trade and investment barriers 
between the two countries, it sets out a schedule for lowering trade barriers 
that might not otherwise occur and thereby facilitate the formation of other 
regional trade agreements.  For Korea, in particular, the formation of 
KAFTA will help to improve its international competitiveness and facilitate 
domestic structural reforms, which is likely to make Korea more attractive to 
foreign investment. 
Despite all the potential gains from the establishment of a KAFTA a major 
stumbling block remains - the Korean agricultural sector (Kwon, 2001b).  
The sector faces serious structural problems. Suitable land for cultivation is 
insufficient to meet the production needs of domestic agricultural demand, 
and the shortage of land in comparison with the agricultural population has 
resulted in small-scale farming that has been the main cause of low 
agricultural productivity and low incomes for farm households.  Low farm 
income has in turn accelerated the migration of young farmers to urban areas. 
The remaining ageing farmers are reluctant to mechanise agriculture and to 
introduce innovations, thereby further slowing productivity and income 
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growth.  These structural problems have contributed to the continual decline 
of the sector, to only 4.6 per cent of GDP and 10.9 per cent of total 
employment in 2000.  Despite this decline in the economic importance of 
the sector, it still exerts considerable political and cultural influence.  As a 
result the government has attempted to maintain the viability of the 
agricultural sector and the rural communities that it supports, as well as 
alleviating and preventing further social problems in urban areas arising from 
internal migration.  Finally, Korean agriculture is characterised not only by 
small-scale farms but also by rice oriented farming systems.  As the staple 
food in Korea rice remains the dominant crop in terms of production, land 
use and government support.  Livestock products, fruits and vegetables are, 
however, growing in importance.  Secure provision of staples, in particular 
rice, from domestic sources is regarded as important for national security. 
Under these circumstances it is difficult to envisage that Korea will agree to a 
KAFTA at the present time, and this goes some way to explaining why 
discussions relating to a FTA between the two countries is not currently on 
the agenda of either. 
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